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Abstract
We apply control theoretic and optimization techniques to adaptively design incentives.
In particular, we consider the problem of a planner with an objective that depends on
data from strategic decision makers. The planner does not know the process by which
the strategic agents make decisions. Under the assumption that the agents are utility
maximizers, we model their interactions as a non–cooperative game and utilize the Nash
equilibrium concept as well as myopic update rules to model the selection of their decision.
By parameterizing the agents’ utility functions and the incentives offered, we develop an
algorithm that the planner can employ to learn the agents’ decision-making processes while
simultaneously designing incentives to change their response to a more desirable response
from the planner’s perspective. We provide convergence results for this algorithm both in
the noise-free and noisy cases and present illustrative examples.
1. Introduction
Due in large part to the increasing adoption of digital technologies, many applications that
once treated users are passive entities must now consider users as active participants. In
many application domains, a planner or coordinator, such as a platform provider (e.g.,
transportation network companies), is tasked with optimizing the performance of a system
that people are actively interacting with, often in real-time. For instance, the planner may
want to drive the system performance to a more desirable behavior. While perhaps on com-
peting ends of the spectrum, both revenue maximization and social welfare maximization
fall under this umbrella.
A significant challenge in optimizing such an objective is the fact that human preferences
are unknown a priori and perhaps their solicited responses, on which the system depends,
may not be reported truthfully (i.e. in accordance with their true preferences) due to issues
related privacy or trust.
We consider a class of incentive design problems in which a planner does not know
the underlying preferences, or decision–making process, of the agents that it is trying to
coordinate. In the economics literature these types of problems are known as problems
of asymmetric information—meaning that the involved parties do not possess the same
information sets and, as is often the case, one party posses some information to which the
other party is not privy.
The particular type of information asymmetry which we consider, i.e. where the pref-
erences of the agents are unknown to the planner, results in a problem of adverse selection.
The classic example of adverse selection is the market for lemons [1] in which the seller of
a used car knows more about the car than the buyer. There are a number of components
that are hidden from the buyer such as the maintenance upkeep history, engine health, etc.
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Hence, the buyer could end up with a lemon instead of a cherry—i.e. a broken down piece
of junk versus a sweet ride. Such problems have long been studied by economists.
The incentive design problem has also been explored by the control community, usually
in the context of (reverse) Stackelberg games (see, e.g., [2–4]). More recently, dynamic
incentive design in the context of applications such as the power grid [5] or network conges-
tion games [6]. We take a slightly different view by employing techniques from learning and
control to develop an adaptive method of designing incentives in a setting where repeated
decisions are made by multiple, competiting agents whose preferences are unknown to the
designer, yet they are subjected to the incentives.
We assume that agents, including the planner, are cost minimizers1. The decision space
of the agents are assumed continuous. We model each agent’s cost as a parametric function
that is dependent on the choices of other agents and is modified by an incentive chosen by the
planner. The planner not knowing the underlying preferences of the agents is tantamount
to it not knowing the value of the parameters of the agents’ cost functions. Such parameters
can be thought of as the type of the agent.
We formulate an adaptive incentive design problem in which the planner iteratively
learns the agents’ preferences and optimizes the incentives offered to the agents so as to
drive them to a more desirable set of choices. We derive an algorithm to solve this problem
and provide theoretical results on convergence for both the case when the agents play
according to a Nash equilibrium as well as the case when the agents play myopically—
e.g. the agents play according to a myopic update rule common in the theory of learning
in games [7]. Specifically, we formulate an algorithm for iteratively estimating preferences
and designing incentives. By adopting tools from adaptive control and online learning, we
show that the algorithm converges under reasonable assumptions.
The results have strong ties to both the adaptive control literature [8–10] and the online
learning literature [11–13]. The former gives us tools to do tracking of both the observed
output (agents’ strategies) and the control input (incentive mechanism). It also allows us to
go one step further and prove parameter convergence under some additional assumptions—
persistence of excitation—on the problem formulation and, in particular, the utility learning
and incentive design algorithm. The latter provides tools that allow us to generalize the
algorithm and get faster convergence of the observed actions of the agents to a more desirable
or even socially optimal outcome.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first introduce the problem of
interest in Section 2. In Sections 3 and 4, we mathematically formulate the utility learning
and incentive design problems and provide an algorithm for adaptive incentive design. We
present convergence results for the Nash and myopic-play cases in Section 5 after which we
draw heavily on adaptive control techniques to provide convergence results when the planner
receives noisy observations. We provide illustrative numerical examples in Section 7 and
conclude in Section 8.
1. While in the remainder, we formulate the entire problem given all agents are cost minimizers, the utility
maximization formulation is completely analogous.
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2. Problem Formulation
We consider a problem in which there is a coordinator or planner with an objective, fP (x, v),
that it desires to optimize by selecting v ∈ V ⊂ Rn; however, this objective is a function of
x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X ⊂ Rn which is the response of n non–cooperative strategic agents each
providing response xi ∈ Xi ⊂ R. Regarding the dimension of each xi, we assume without
loss of generality that they are scalars. All the theoretical results and insights apply to the
more general setting where each agent’s choice is of arbitrary finite dimension.
The goal of the planner is to design a mechanism to coordinate the agents by incentivizing
them choose an x that ultimately leads to minimization of fP (x, v). Yet, the coordinator
does not know the decision making process by which these agents arrive at their collective
response x. As a consequence there is asymmetric information between the agents and the
planner.
Let us suppose that the each agent has some type θ and a process Mθi that determines
their choice xi(θi). This process is dependent on the other agents and any mechanism
designed by the planner. The classical approach in the economics literature is to solve this
problem of so-called adverse selection [14] by designing mechanisms that induce agents’ to
take actions in a way that corresponds with their true decision-making processMθi . In this
approach, it is assumed that the coordinator has a prior on the type space of the agents—
e.g., a probability distribution on θ. The coordinator then designs a mechanism (usually
static) based on this assumed prior that encourages agents to act in accordance with their
true preferences.
We take an alternative view in which we adopt control theoretic and optimization tech-
niques to adaptively learn the agents’ types while designing incentives to coordinate the
agents around a more desirable (from the point of view of the planner) choice x. Such a
framework departs from one-shot decisions that assume all prior information is known at
the start of the engagement and opens up opportunities for mechanisms that are dynamic
and can learn over time.
We thus take the view that, in order to optimize its objective, the planner must learn the
decision-making process and simultaneously design a mechanism that induces the agents to
respond in such a way such that the planner’s objective is optimized.
The planner first optimizes its objective function to find the desired response xd and
the desired vd. That is, it determines the optimizers of its cost as if x and v are its decision
variables. Of course, it may be the case that the set of optimizers of fP contains more than
one pair (xd, vd); in this case, the coordinator must choose amongst the set of optimizers. In
order to realize (xd, vd), the planner must incentivize the agents to play xd by synthesizing
mappings γi ∈ Γ ⊂ C2(X,R) for each i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n} such that γi(xd) = vdi ∈ Vi ⊂ R
and xd = (xd1, . . . , x
d
n) is the collective response of the agents under their true processes
{Mθi }i∈I .
We will consider two scenarios: (i) Agents play according to a Nash equilibrium strategy;
(ii) Agents play according to a myopic update rule—e.g. approximate gradient play or
fictitious play [7].
In the first scenario, if the agents are assumed to play according to a Nash equilibrium
strategy, then xd must be a Nash equilibrium in the game induced by γ = (γ1, . . . , γn). In
particular, using the notation x−i = {x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn}, let agent i have nominal
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cost fi ∈ C2(X,R) and incentivized cost
fγii (xi, x−i) = fi(xi, x−i) + γi(xi, x−i). (1)
The desired response xd is a Nash equilibrium of the incentivized game (fγ11 , . . . , f
γn
n ) if
xdi ∈ arg min
xi∈Xi
fγii (xi, x
d
−i). (2)
Hence, xdi is a best response to x
d
−i for each i ∈ I. Formally, we define a Nash equilibrium
as follows.
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium of the Incentivized Game). A point x ∈ X is a Nash
equilibrium of the incentivized game (fγ11 , . . . , f
γn
n ) if
fγii (x) ≤ fγii (x′i, x−i), ∀ x′i ∈ Xi. (3)
If, for each i ∈ I, the inequality in (3) holds only for a neighborhood Wi ⊂ Xi of xi,
then x is a local Nash equilibrium.
We make use of a sub-class of Nash equilibria called differential Nash equilibria, as they
can be characterized locally and thus, amenable to computation. Let the differential game
form [15, Definition 2] ω : X → Rn be defined by ω(x) = (D1f1(x), . . . , Dnfn(x)).
Definition 2 ( [15, Definition 4]). A strategy x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X is a differential Nash
equilibrium of (fγ11 , . . . , f
γn
n ) if ω(x) = 0 and D2iifi(x) is positive definite for each i ∈ I.
Differential Nash equilibria are known to be generic amongst local Nash equilibria [16],
structurally stable and attracting under taˆtonnement [15].
In the second scenario, we assume the agents play according to a myopic update rule [7]
defined as follows. Given the incentive γi, agent i’s response is determined by the mapping
gγii (x) = gi(x) + γi(x) (4)
In addition, function gγii ∈ C2(Xk+1,R) maps the history, from time 0 up to time k, of
the agents’ previous collective response to the current response where Xk+1 is the product
space X × · · · ×X with k + 1 copies of the space X.
We aim to design an algorithm in which the planner performs a utility learning step and
an incentive design step such that as the planner iterates through the algorithm, agents’
collective observed response converges to the desired response xd and the value of the
incentive mapping evaluated at xd converges to the desired value vd. In essence, we aim
to ensure asymptotic or approximate incentive compatibility. In the sections that follow,
we describe the utility learning and the incentive design steps of the algorithm and then,
present the algorithm itself.
3. Utility Learning Formulation
We first formulate a general utility learning problem, then we give examples in the the
Nash–play and myopic–play cases.
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3.1 Utility Learning Under Nash–Play
We assume that the planner knows the parametric structure of the agents’ nominal cost
functions and receives observations of the agents’ choices over time. That is, for each i ∈ I,
we assume that the nominal cost function of agent i has the form of a generalized linear
model
fi(x) = 〈Φ(x), θ∗i 〉 =
∑m
j=1 φj(x)θ
∗
i,j (5)
where Φ(x) is a vector of basis functions given by Φ(x) = [φ1(x) · · · φm(x)]T , assumed to
be known to the planner, and θ∗i ∈ Rm is a parameter vector, θ∗i = [θ∗i,1 · · · θ∗i,m]T , assumed
unknown to the planner.
While our theory is developed for this case, we show through simulations in Section 7
that the planner can be agnostic to the agents’ decision-making processes and still drive
them to the desired outcome.
Let the set of basis functions for the agents’ cost functions be denoted by Fφ. We
assume that elements of Fφ are C2(X,R) and Lipschitz continuous. Thus the derivative of
any function in Fφ is uniformly bounded.
The admissible set of parameters for agent i, denoted by Θi, is assumed to be a compact
subset of Rm and to contain the true parameter vector θ∗i . We will use the notation fi(x; θ)
when we need to make the dependence on the parameter θ explicit.
Note that we are limiting the problem of asymmetric information to one of adverse
selection [14] since it is the parameters of the cost functions that are unknown to the
coordinator.
Similarly, we assume that the admissible incentive mappings have a generalized linear
model of the form
γi(x) = 〈Ψ(x), αi〉 =
∑s
j=1 ψj(x)αi,j (6)
where Ψ(x) = [ψ1(x) · · · ψs(x)]T is a vector of basis functions, belonging to a finite collection
Fψ, and assumed to be C2(X,R) and Lipschitz continuous, and αi = (αi,1 · · · αi,s) ∈ Rs
are parameters.
Remark 1. This framework can be generalized to use different subsets of the basis functions
for different players, simply by constraining some of the parameters θi or αi to be zero. We
choose to present the theory with a common number of basis functions across players in an
effort to minimize the amount of notation that needs to be tracked by the reader.
At each iteration k, the planner receives the collective response from the agents, i.e. xk =
(xk1, . . . , x
k
n), and has the incentive parameters α
k = (αk1 , . . . , α
k
n) that were issued.
We denote the set of observations up to time k + 1 by {xt}k+1t=0 —where x0 is the ob-
served Nash equilibrium of the nominal game (without incentives)—and the set of incentive
parameters {αt}kt=0. Each of the observations is assumed to be an Nash equilibrium.
For the incentivized game (fγi1 , . . . , f
γn
n ), a Nash equilibrium x necessarily satisfies the
first- and second-order conditions Dif
γi
i (x) = 0 and D
2
iif
γi
i (x) ≥ 0 for each i ∈ I (see [15,
Proposition 1]).
Under this model, we assume that the agents are playing a local Nash—that is, each xk
is a local Nash equilibrium so that
0 = Dif
γi
i (x
k) = 〈DiΦ(xk), θ∗i 〉+ 〈DiΨ(xk), αk−1i 〉, (7)
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for k ∈ N+ and 0 = 〈DiΦ(x0), θ∗i 〉, where DiΦ(xk) = [Diφ1(xk) · · · Diφm(xk)]T with Diφj
denoting the derivative of φj with respect to xi and where we define DiΨ(x
k) similarly. By
an abuse of notation, we treat derivatives as vectors instead of co-vectors.
As noted earlier, without loss of generality, we take xi ∈ R. This makes the notation
significantly simpler and the presentation of results much more clear and clean. All details
for the general setting are provided in [17].
In addition, for each i ∈ I, we have
0 ≤ D2iifγii (xk) = 〈D2iiΦ(xk), θ∗i 〉+ 〈D2iiΨ(xk), αk−1i 〉 (8)
for k ∈ N+ and 0 ≤ 〈D2iiΦ(x0), θ∗i 〉 where D2iiΦ and D2iiΨ are the second derivative of Φ and
Ψ, respectively, with respect to xi.
Let the admissible set of θi’s at iteration k be denoted by Θ
k
i . They are defined using the
second–order conditions from the assumption that the observations at times t ∈ {1, . . . , k}
are local Nash equilibria and are given by
Θki ={θi ∈ Θi| 〈D2iiΦ(xt), θi〉+ 〈D2iiΨ(xt), αt−1i 〉 ≥ 0,
t ∈ {1, . . . , k}} ⊆ Θi. (9)
These sets are nested, i.e. Θki ⊆ Θk−1i ⊆ · · · ⊆ Θ0i ⊆ Θi, since at each iteration an additional
constraint is added to the previous set. These sets are also convex since they are defined
by semi–definite constraints [18]. Moreover, θ∗i ∈ Θki for all k since, by assumption, each
observation xk is a local Nash equilibrium.
Since the planner sets the incentives, given the response xk, they can compute the
quantity −〈DiΨi(xk), αk−1i 〉, which is equal to
−〈DiΨi(xk), αk−1i 〉 = 〈DiΦi(xk), θ∗i 〉
by the first order Nash condition (7). Thus, if we let yk+1i = −〈DiΨi(xk+1), αki 〉 and
ξki = DiΦi(x
k+1), we have
yk+1i = 〈ξki , θ∗i 〉.
Then, the coordinator has observations {yti}k+1t=1 and regression vectors {ξti}kt=0. We use the
notation ξk = (ξk1 , . . . , ξ
k
n) for the regression vectors of all the agents at iteration k.
3.2 Utility Learning Under Myopic–Play
As in the Nash–play case, we assume the planner knows the parametric structure of the
myopic update rule. That is to say, the nominal update function gi is parameterized by
θi over basis functions {φ1, . . . , φm} ⊂ Fφ and the incentive mapping γki at iteration k
is parameterized by αki over basis functions {ψ1, . . . , ψs} ⊂ Fψ. We assume the planner
observes the initial response x0 and we denote the past responses up to iteration k by
x(0,k) = (x0, . . . , xk). The general architecture for the myopic update rule is given by
xk+1i = g
γi
i (x
(0,k)
i , x
(0,k)
−i ) (10)
= 〈Φi(x(0,k)i , x(0,k)−i ), θ∗i 〉+ 〈Ψi(x(0,k)i , x(0,k)−i ), αki 〉. (11)
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Note that the update rule does not need to depend on the whole sequence of past response.
It could depend just on the past response xk or a subset, say x(j,l) for 0 ≤ j ≤ l ≤ k.
As before, we denote the set of admissible parameters for player i by Θi which we assume
to be a compact subset of Rm. In contrast to the Nash–play case, our admissible set of
parameters is no long time varying so that Θki = Θi for all k.
Keeping consistent with the notation of the previous sections, we let ξki = Φi(x
k) and
yk+1i = x
k+1
i − 〈Ψi(xk), αki 〉 so that the myopic update rule can be re-written as yk+1i =
〈ξki , θ∗i 〉. Analogous to the previous case, the coordinator has observations {yti}k+1t=1 and
regression vectors {ξti}kt=0. Again, we use the notation ξk = (ξk1 , . . . , ξkn) for the regression
vectors of all the agents at iteration k.
Note that the form of the myopic update rule is general enough to accommodate a
number of game-theoretic learning algorithms including approximate fictitious play and
gradient play [7].
3.3 Unified Framework for Utility Learning
We can describe both the Nash–play and myopic–play cases in a unified framework as fol-
lows. At iteration k, the planner receives a response xk which lives in the set Xk(x(0,k−1), θ∗, αk−1)
which is either the set of local Nash equilibria of the incentivized game or the unique re-
sponse determined by the incentivized myopic update rule at iteration k. The planner
uses the past responses {xt}kt=0 and incentive parameters {αt}kt=0 to generate the set of
observations {yt}k+1t=1 and regression vectors {ξt}kt=0.
The utility learning problem is formulated as an online optimization problem in which
parameter updates are calculated following the gradient of a loss function. For each i ∈ I,
consider the loss function given by
`(θki ) =
1
2‖yk+1i − 〈ξki , θki 〉‖22 (12)
that evaluates the error between the predicted observation and the true observation at time
k for each player.
In order to minimize this loss, we introduce a well-known generalization of the projection
operator. Denote by ∂f(x) the set of subgradients of f : X → R at x. A convex continuous
function β : Θ→ R is a distance generating function with modulus ν > 0 with respect to a
reference norm ‖ · ‖, if the set Θ◦ = {θ ∈ Θ|∂β(θ) 6= ∅} is convex and restricted to Θ◦, β is
continuously differentiable and strongly convex with parameter ν, that is
〈θ′ − θ,∇β(θ′)−∇β(θ)〉 ≥ ν‖θ′ − θ‖2, ∀ θ′, θ ∈ Θ◦.
The function V : Θ◦ ×Θ→ R+, defined by
V (θ1, θ2) = β(θ2)−
(
β(θ1) +∇β(θ1)T (θ2 − θ1)
)
is the Bregman divergence [19] associated with β. By definition, V (θ1, ·) is non-negative
and strongly convex with modulus ν. Given a subset Θk ⊂ Θ and a point θ ∈ Θk, the
mapping PΘk,θ : Rm → Θk defined by
PΘk,θ(g) = arg min
θ′∈Θk
{〈g, θ′ − θ〉+ V (θ, θ′)} . (13)
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is the prox-mapping induced by V on Θk. This mapping is well-defined, the minimizer
is unique by strong convexity of V (θ, ·), and is a contraction at iteration k, [20, Proposi-
tion 5.b].
Given the loss function ` : Θ→ R, a positive, non-increasing sequence of learning rates
(ηk), and a distance generating function β, the parameter estimate of each θi is updated at
iteration k as follows
θk+1i = P
k+1
Θki ,θ
k
i
(
ηk∇`(θki )
)
. (14)
Note that if the distance generating function is β(θ) = 12‖θ‖22, then the associated Bregman
divergence is the Euclidean distance, V (θ, θ′) = 12‖θ − θ′‖22, and the corresponding prox–
mapping is the Euclidean projection on the set Θi, which we denote by PΘi,θ(g) = ΠΘi(θ−g),
so that
θk+1i = ΠΘki
(
θki − ηk∇`(θki )
)
. (15)
4. Incentive Design Formulation
In the previous section, we described the parameter update step that will be used in our
utility learning and incentive design problem. We now describe how the incentive pa-
rameters αk for each iteration are selected. In particular, at iteration k, after updat-
ing parameter estimates for each agent, the data the planner has includes the past ob-
servations {yt}k+1t=1 , incentive parameters {αt}kt=0, and has an estimate of each θk+1i for
i ∈ I. The planner then uses the past data along with the parameter estimates to find an
αk+1 = (αk+11 , . . . , α
k+1
n ) such that the incentive mapping for each player evaluates to v
d
i at
xdi and x
d ∈ Xk+1(x(0,k+1), θ∗, αk+1). This is to say that if the agents are rational and play
Nash, then xd is a local Nash equilibrium of the game (fγ11 (x; θ
k+1
1 ), . . . , f
γn
n (x; θk+1n )) where
fγii (x; θ
k+1
i ) denotes the incentivized cost of player i parameterized by θ
k+1
i . On the other
hand, if the agents are myopic, then, for each i ∈ I, xdi = 〈Φi(xk), θk+1i 〉+ 〈Ψi(xk), αk+1i 〉.
In the following two subsections, for each of these cases, we describe how αk+1 is selected.
4.1 Incentive Design: Nash–Play
Given that γk+1i is parameterized by α
k+1
i , the goal is to find α
k+1
i for each i ∈ I such that
xd is a local Nash equilibrium of the game(〈Φ1(x), θk+11 〉+ 〈Ψ1(x), αk+11 〉, . . . , 〈Φn(x), θk+1n 〉+ 〈Ψn(x), αk+1n )〉)
and such that 〈Ψi(xd), αk+1i 〉 = vdi for each i ∈ I.
Assumption 1. For every {θi}ni=1 where θi ∈ Θi, there exist αi ∈ Rs for each i ∈ I such
that xd is the induced differential Nash equilibrium in the game (fγ11 (x; θ1), . . . , f
γn
n (x; θn))
and γi(x
d) = vdi where γi(x) = 〈Ψi(x), αi〉.
We remark that the above assumption is not restrictive in the following sense. Finding
αi that induces the desired Nash equilibrium and results in γi evaluating to the desired
incentive value amounts to finding αk+1i such that the first– and second–order sufficient
conditions for a local Nash equilibrium are satisfied given our estimate of the agents’ cost
8
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functions. That is, for each i ∈ I, we need to find αk+1i satisfying{
02×1 = ζk+1i + Λiα
k+1
i
0 < 〈D2iiΦi(xd), θki 〉+ 〈D2iiΨi(xd), αk+1i 〉
(16)
where
ζk+1i =
[〈DiΦi(xd), θk+1i 〉
−vdi
]
and
Λi =
[
DiΨi(x
d)T
Ψi(x
d)T
]
∈ R2×s
If Λi is full rank, i.e. has rank 2, then there exists a α
k+1
i that solves the first equation
in (16). If the number of basis functions s satisfies s > 2, then the rank condition is not
unreasonable and in fact, there are multiple solutions. In essence, by selecting s to be large
enough, the planner is allowing for enough degrees of freedom to ensure there exists a set of
parameters α that induce the desired result. Moreover, the problem of finding αk+1i reduces
to a convex feasibility problem.
The convex feasibility problem defined by (16) can be formulated as a constrained least–
squares optimization problem. Indeed, for each i ∈ I,
(P1)
 minαk+1i ‖ζ
k+1
i + Λiα
k+1
i ‖22
s.t. 〈D2iiΦi(xd), θk+1i 〉+ 〈D2iiΨi(xd), αk+1i )〉 ≥ ε
for some ε > 0. By Assumption 1, for each i ∈ I, there is an αk+1 such that the cost is
exactly minimized.
The choice of ε determines how well-conditioned the second-order derivatives of agents’
costs with respect to their own choice variables is. In addition, we note that if there are
a large number of incentive basis functions, it may be reasonable to incorporate a cost for
sparsity—e.g., λi‖αk+1i ‖1; however, the optimal solution in this case is not guaranteed to
satisfy (16).
It is desirable for the induced local Nash equilibrium to be a stable, non-degenerate
differential Nash equilibrium so that it is attracting in a neighborhood under the gradient
flow [15]. To enforce this, the planner must add additional constraints to the feasibility prob-
lem defined by (16). In particular, second–order conditions on player cost functions must be
satisfied, i.e. that the derivative of the differential game form ω is positive–definite [15, The-
orem 2]. This reduces to ensuring D2Φ(x, θk+1) +D2Ψ(x, αk+1) > 0 where
D2Φ(x, θk+1) =
〈D
2
11Φ1(x), θ
k+1
1 〉 · · · 〈D2n1Φ1(x), θk+11 〉
...
. . .
...
〈D21nΦn(x), θk+1n 〉 · · · 〈D2nnΦn(x), θk+1n 〉
 ,
and D2Ψ(x, α(k+1)) is defined analogously. Notice that this constraint is a semi–definite
constraint [18] and thus, the problem of finding αk+1 that induces xd to be a stable, non–
degenerate differential Nash equilibrium can be formulated as a constrained least–squares
9
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optimization problem. Indeed,
(P2)
{
min
αk+1
∑
i ‖ζk+1i + Λiαk+1i ‖22
s.t. D2Φ(xd, θk+1) +D2Ψ(xd, αk+1) ≥ ε
for some ε > 0. The optimization problem (P2) can be written as a semi–definite program.
Again, a regularization term can be incorporated in order to find sparse parameters
αk+1i . However, by introducing regularization, the condition ζ
k+1
i + Λiα
k+1
i = 0 will in
general no longer be satisfied by the solution.
Ensuring the desired Nash equilibrium is a stable, non–degenerate differential Nash equi-
librium means that, first and foremost, the desired Nash equilibrium is isolated [15, Theo-
rem 2]. Thus, there is no nearby Nash equilibria. Furthermore, non–degenerate differential
Nash equilibria are generic [16, Theorem 1] and structurally stable [15, Theorem 3] so that
they are robust to small modeling errors and environmental noise. Stability ensures that
if at each iteration players play according to a myopic approximate best response strategy
(gradient play), then they will converge to the desired Nash equilibrium [15, Proposition 2].
Hence, if a stable equilibrium is desired by the planner, we can consider a modified version
of Assumption 1.
Assumption 1’ (Modified—Stable Differential Nash). For every {θi}ni=1 where θi ∈ Θi,
there exist αi ∈ Rs for each i ∈ I such that xd is the induced stable, non–degenerate
differential Nash equilibrium of (fγ11 (x; θ1), . . . , f
γn
n (x; θn)) and γi(x
d) = vdi where γi(x) =
Ψi(x)
Tαi.
Given θk = (θk1 , . . . , θ
k
n), let A(θk, x, v) be the set of αk = (αk1 , . . . , αkn) such that x
is a differential Nash equilibrium of (fγ11 (x), . . . , f
γn
n (x)) and γi(x) = vi where γi(x) =
〈Ψi(x), αki 〉. Similarly, let As(θk, x, v) be the set of αk that induce x to be a stable, non–
degenerate differential Nash equilibrium where γi(x) = vi. By Assumptions 1 and 1’,
A(θk, x, v) and As(θk, x, v), respectively, are non–empty. Further, it is straightforward to
find an αk belonging to A(θk, x, v) (resp., As(θk, x, v)) by solving the convex problem stated
in (P1) (resp., (P2)).
4.2 Incentive Design: Myopic–Play
Given θk+1i for each i ∈ I, the planner seeks an incentive mapping γk+1 = (γk+11 , . . . , γk+1n )
that induces the desired response xd and such that γk+1i (x
d) = vdi for each i ∈ I. As before,
given that γi has been parameterized, this amounts to finding α
k+1
i such that
xdi = 〈Φ(xk), θk+1i 〉+ 〈Ψ(xk), αk+1i 〉 (17)
and such that 〈Ψ(xd), αk+1i 〉 = vdi for each i ∈ I.
Assumption 2. For every {θi}ni=1 where θi ∈ Θi, there exist αi ∈ Rsi for each i ∈ I such
that xd is the estimated collective response—that is, (17) is satisfied for each i ∈ I—and
such that 〈Ψ(xd), αk+1i 〉 = vdi .
As in the Nash–play case, finding the incentive parameters at each iteration that induce
the desired response amounts to solving a set of linear equations for each player. That is,
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Algorithm 1: Adaptive Incentive Design
1: k ← 0
2: If Myopic–play: receive x0
3: Choose θ0i ∈ Θi, α0i ∈ Rs for each i ∈ I
4: Issue incentive mapping with parameters α0i
5: do
6: issue incentives with parameters αk
7: Receive xk+1 ∈ Xk(x(0,k), θ∗, αk).
8: Compute yk+1, ξk and incur loss `(θki )
9: θk+1i = P
k+1
θki
(
ηk∇`(θki )
)
for each i ∈ I
10: for i ∈ I:
11: if Nash–play:
12: αk+1i ∈ A(θk+1, xd, vd) [or As(θk+1, xd, vd)]
13: elif myopic–play: αk+1i ∈ Am(θk+1, xd, vd)
14: k ← k + 1
15: end do
for each i ∈ I, the coordinator must solve
0pi×1 = ζ˜
k+1
i − Λ˜ki αk+1i =
[
xdi − 〈Φ(xk), θk+1i 〉
vdi
]
−
[
Ψi(x
k)T
Ψi(x
d)T
]
αk+1i (18)
for αk+1i . Define Am(θk+1, xk, xd, vd) to be the set of αk+1i that satisfy (18).
The above set of equations will have a solution if the matrix Λ˜ki has rank 2. Choosing the
set of basis functions {ψj}sj=1 such that s > 2 makes this rank condition not unreasonable.
One unfortunate difference between the Nash–play case and the present case of myopic–play
is that in the former the coordinator could check the rank condition a priori given that it
does not depend on the observations. On the other hand, Λ˜ki depends on the observation
at each iteration and thus, can only be verify online.
As before, the problem can be cast as a least–squares optimization problem with cost
‖ζ˜k+1i − Λ˜ki αk+1i ‖22.
5. Convergence in the Noise Free Case
In Algorithm 1, the steps of the utility learning and incentive design algorithm are formal-
ized. We now discuss the convergence results for the proposed algorithm.
Definition 3. If, for each i ∈ I, there exists a constant 0 < ci,s <∞ such that ξki (ξki )T ≤
ci,sI for all k, then we say the algorithm is stable.
Lipschitz continuity of the functions in Fφ implies stability.
Definition 4. If for each i ∈ I, there exists a constant 0 < ci,p < ∞ such that ci,pI ≤
ξki (ξ
k
i )
T for all k, we will say the algorithm is persistently exciting.
Let cs = maxi∈I ci,s and cp = mini∈I ci,p. The following lemma is a straghtforward
extension of [12, Lemma 2.1] and we leave the proof to Appendix A.
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Lemma 1. For every θ∗ ∈ Θk+1, θk ∈ (Θk)◦, and g ∈ Rm, we have
V (P k+1
θk
(g), θ∗) ≤ V (θk, θ∗) + 〈g, θ∗ − θk〉+ 12ν ‖g‖2∗
To compactify the notation, let Vk(θi) ≡ V (θki , θi) and ∆θki = θ∗i − θki .
Theorem 1. Suppose Algorithm 1 with prox–mapping defined by β (modulus ν) is persis-
tently exciting, stable and that the step–size η is chosen such that η − η22ν cs > ε for some ε
such that 0 < ε < 12cp with cp = mini∈I ci,p and where 0 < cs <∞ is such that ‖ξki ‖2∗ ≤ cs.
We have the following:
(a) For each i ∈ I, Vk(θ∗i ) converges and
lim
k→∞
‖(ξki )T (θ∗i − θki )‖2 = 0. (19)
(b) If β(θi) =
1
2‖θi‖22, then for each i ∈ I, θki converges exponentially fast to θ∗i .
Proof. We prove part (a) first. Since elements of Fφ are Lipschitz, ξki (ξki )T ≤ cˆsI so that
we may find a cs > 0 such that for all k, ‖ξki ‖2∗ ≤ cs. Lemma 1 implies that
Vk+1(θ
∗
i ) ≤ Vk(θ∗i )− η〈∆θki ,∇`(θki )〉+ η
2
2ν ‖∇`(θki )‖2∗. (20)
Hence,
Vk+1(θ
∗
i ) ≤ Vk(θ∗i )− η‖(ξki )T (∆θki )‖2 + 12ν η2‖ξki ‖2∗‖(ξki )T (∆θki )‖2
≤ Vk(θ∗i )−
(
η − 12ν η2‖ξki ‖2∗
) ‖(ξki )T (∆θki )‖2
≤ Vk(θ∗i )−
(
η − 12ν η2cs
) ‖(ξki )T (∆θki )‖2
≤ Vk(θ∗i )− ε‖(ξki )T (∆θki )‖2 (21)
Thus, ‖(ξki )T (∆θki )‖2 ≤ 1ε (Vk(θ∗i )− Vk+1(θ∗i )).
Summing k from 0 to K, we have∑K
k=0 ‖(ξki )T (θ∗i − θki )‖2 ≤ ε−1(V0(θ∗i )− VK+1(θ∗i )) ≤ ε−1V0(θ∗i )
so that limK→∞
∑K
k=0 ‖(ξki )T (θ∗i − θki )‖2 ≤ ε−1V0(θ∗i ) < ∞. This, in turn, implies that
limk→∞ ‖ξki (θ∗i − θki )‖2 = 0. From (21) and the fact that Vk(θ∗i ) is always postive, we see
that Vk(θ
∗
i ) is a decreasing sequence and hence, it converges. The analysis holds for each
i ∈ I.
Now, we show part (b). Suppose that β(θi) =
1
2‖θi‖22. Then, starting with the inequality
in (21), we have that
Vk+1(θ
∗
i ) ≤ Vk(θ∗i )− ε(∆θki )T ξki (ξki )T (∆θki ) ≤ Vk(θ∗i )− εcp(∆θki )T (∆θki ) ≤ Vk(θ∗i )(1− 2cpε)
since ξki (ξ
k
i )
T ≤ csI (i.e. stability), η − 12η2cs > ε by construction, and cpI ≤ ξki (ξki )T
(i.e. persistence of excitation). Since 0 < ε < 1/(2cp), we have that 1 − 2cpε < e−2cpε so
that Vk+1(θ
∗
i ) < e
−2cpεVk(θ∗i ). This implies that VK(θ
∗
i ) < e
−2cpKεV0(θ∗i ). Therefore we
have that θki → θ∗i exponentially fast. The same argument holds for each i ∈ I.
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For general prox–mappings, Theorem 1 lets us conclude that the observations converge
to zero and that the prox–function Vk(θi) converges. Knowing the parameter values—a
consequence of choosing β(θi) =
1
2‖θi‖22—allows for the opportunity to gain qualitative
insights into how agents’ preferences affect the outcome of their strategic interaction. On
the other hand, more general distance generating functions selected to reflect the geometry
of Θ have the potential to improve convergence rates [12].
Corollary 1. Suppose agents play according to the myopic update rule (11). Under the
assumptions of Theorem 1, for each i ∈ I, ‖xt+1i − xdi ‖2 → 0 and |vt+1i − vd|2 → 0.
Proof. Since agents play myopically, we have that xdi = 〈Φ(xk), θki 〉+〈Ψ(xk), αki 〉 and the pre-
dicted induced response is xdi = 〈Φ(xk), θki 〉+〈Ψ(xk), αki 〉 so that ‖xk+1i −xdi ‖2 = ‖(ξki )T (θ∗i −
θki )‖2. Thus, by Theorem 1-(a), limk→∞ ‖xk+1i − xdi ‖2 = 0. Moreover, by Assumption 2, we
know that each αk+1i satisfies 〈Ψ(xd), αk+1i 〉 = vdi . Define vk+1i = 〈Ψ(xk+1), αk+1〉. Then,
|vk+1i − vdi |2 = |〈Ψ(xk+1)−Ψ(xd), αk+1i 〉|2
≤ ‖Ψ(xk+1)−Ψ(xd)‖2‖αk+1i ‖2∗.
Since each element of Fψ is Lipschitz, ‖Ψ(xk+1)−Ψ(xd)‖ ≤ C‖xk+1−xd‖ for some constant
C > 0. Hence, |vk+1i − vdi |2 ≤ C2‖αk+1i ‖2∗‖xk+1 − xd‖2 and since ‖xk+1 − xd‖2 converges to
zero and ‖αk+1i ‖2∗ <∞, we get that |vk+1i − vd|2 converges to zero.
In the Nash–play case, we can use the fact that non–degenerate differential Nash equilib-
ria are structurally stable [15, Theorem 3] to determine a bound on how close an equilibrium
of the incentived game, (fγ11 (x; θ
∗
1), . . . , f
γn
n (x; θ∗n)) with γi(x) = 〈Ψ(x), αki 〉 for each i ∈ I,
is to the desired Nash equilibrium xd. Note that the observed Nash equilibrium xk+1 is in
the set of Nash equilirbia of the incentivized game.
Let ωGγ (θ, x) = (D1f
γ1
1 (x; θ1), . . . , Dnf
γn
n (x; θ)) be the differential game form [15] of
the incentivized game Gγ = (fγ11 , . . . , fγnn ). By a slight abuse of notation, we will denote
D1ωGγ (θ, x) andD2ωGγ (θ, x) as the local representation of the differential of ωGγ with respect
to θ and x respectively. If the parameters of the incentive mapping αk at each iteration k
are C2 with respect to xk and θk, then the differential of ω is well–defined. We remark that
we formulated the optimization problem for finding the α’s as a constrainted least–squares
problem and there are existing results for determining when solutions to such problems are
continuously dependent on parameter perturbations [21,22].
Theorem 2. Suppose that for each k, αk(θ, x) ∈ C2(Rnm ×Rn,Rs) is chosen such that xd
is a non–degenerate differential Nash equilibrium. For ‖θk − θ∗‖ sufficiently small, there
is a Nash equilibrium x∗ of Gγ = (fγ11 (x; θ∗1), . . . , fγnn (x; θ∗n)) that is near the desired Nash
equilibrium, i.e. there exists ε¯ > 0, such that for all θk ∈ Bε¯(θ∗),
‖x∗ − xd‖ ≤ (sup0≤λ≤1 ‖Dg((1− λ)θ∗ + λθt)‖) ‖θk − θ∗‖
where Dg(θ) = −(D2ωGγ )−1(θ, xd) ◦ D1ωGγ (θ, xd). Furthermore, if ‖Dg(θ)‖ is uniformly
bounded by M > 0 on Bε¯(θ
∗), then ‖x∗ − xd‖ ≤M‖θk − θ∗‖.
Proof. Consider the differential game form ωGγ (θ, x) which is given by
ωGγ (θ, x) =
∑n
i=1
(∑m
j=1Diφj(x)θi,j +
∑s
k=1Diψk(x)αi,j
)
dxi.
13
Ratliff and Fiez
Since xd is a non–degenerate differential Nash equilibrium, D2ωGγ (θ∗, xd) is an isomor-
phism. Thus, by the Implicit Function Theorem [23, Theorem 2.5.7], there exists a neigh-
borhood W0 of θ
∗ and a C1 function g : W0 → X such that for all θ ∈ W0, ω(θ, g(θ)) = 0.
Furthermore, Dg(θ) = −(D2ωGγ )−1(θ, xd) ◦D1ωGγ (θ, xd). Let Bε¯(θ∗) be the largest ε¯–ball
inside of W0. Since Bε¯(θ
∗) is convex, by Proposition [23, Proposition 2.4.7], we have that
g(θk)− g(θ∗) = (∫ 10 Dg((1− λ)θ∗ + λθk) dλ) · (θk − θ∗)
Hence, since ‖x∗ − xd‖ = ‖g(θk)− g(θ∗)‖, we have that
‖x∗ − xd‖ ≤ (sup0≤λ≤1 ‖Dg((1− λ)θ∗ + λθk)‖)‖θk − θ∗‖
Now, if ‖Dg(θ∗)‖ is uniformly bounded by M > 0 on Bε¯(θ∗), then its straightforward to
see from the above inequality that ‖x∗ − xd‖ ≤M‖θk − θ∗‖.
As a consequence of Theorem 1-(b) and Theorem 2, there exists a finite iteration k for
which ‖θ∗i − θki ‖22 is sufficiently small for each i ∈ I so that a local Nash equilibrium of the
incentivized game at time k is arbitrarily close to the desired Nash equilibrium xd.
There may be multiple Nash equilibria of the incentivized game; hence, if the agents
converge to x∗ then the observed local Nash equilibrium is near the desired Nash equilibria.
We know that for stable, non–degenerate differential Nash equilibria, agents will converge
locally if following the gradient flow determined by the differential game form ω [15, Propo-
sition 2].
Corollary 2. Suppose the assumptions of Theorem 2 hold and that x∗ is stable. If agents
follow the gradient of their cost, i.e. −Difi, then they will converge locally to x∗. Moreover,
there exists an ε¯ > 0 such that for all θk ∈ Bε¯(θ∗),
‖x∗ − xd‖ ≤ (sup0≤λ≤1 ‖Dg((1− λ)θ∗ + λθk)‖) ‖θk − θ∗‖
The proof follows directly from Theorem 2 and [15, Proposition 2].
The size of the neighborhood of initial conditions for which agents converge to the
desired Nash can be approximated using techniques for computation of region of attraction
via a Lyapunov function [10, Chapter 5]. This is in part due to the fact that in the case
where αk is chosen so that xd is stable, i.e. dωGγ (θk, xd) > 0, we have that dωGγ (θ∗, x∗) > 0
for θk near θ∗ since the spectrum of dωGγ varies continuously.
Moreover, it is possible to explicitly construct the neighborhood W0 obtained via the
Implicit Function Theorem in Theorem 2 (see, e.g. [24, Theorem 2.9.10] or [17]).
The result of Theorem 1-(b) implies that the incentive value under x∗ from Theorem 2
is arbitrarily close to the desired incentive value.
Corollary 3. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1-(b) and Theorem 2, there exists a fi-
nite K such that for all k ≥ K, ‖x∗ − xd‖22 ≤ MC¯e−2cpkε where C¯ = nmaxi{2V0(θ∗i )},
cp = mini∈I ci,p, and x∗ is the (local) Nash equilibrium of the incentivized game sat-
isfying ‖x∗ − xd‖ ≤ M‖θk − θ∗‖ for all θk ∈ Bε¯(θ∗). Furthermore, for each i ∈ I,
|v∗i − vdi |2 ≤ MC2‖αki ‖22C¯e−2cpkε for all k ≥ K where C is the Lipschitz bound on Ψ
and v∗i = 〈Ψ(x∗), αki 〉.
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Proof. Choose K such that, for each i ∈ I, 2V0(θ∗i )e−2εcpK < ε¯ so that ‖θki − θi‖22 ≤
2V0(θ
∗
i )e
−2εcpk for all k ≥ K. Thus, ‖θk − θ∗‖22 ≤ Ce−2εcpk, for all k ≥ K. By Theorem 2,
we have that ‖x∗ − xd‖22 ≤ MC¯e−2εcpk for all k ≥ K where M is the uniform bound on
‖Dg(θ∗)‖. We know that vdi = 〈Ψ(xd), αki 〉 and v∗i = 〈Ψ(x∗), αki 〉. Hence, since each element
of Fψ is Lipschitz, we have that for all k ≥ K, that
|v∗i − vdi |2 = |〈Ψ(x∗)−Ψ(xd), αki 〉|2
≤ ‖Ψ(x∗)−Ψ(xd)‖‖αki ‖22
≤ C2‖αki ‖22‖x∗ − xd‖22
≤MC2‖αki ‖22C¯e−2εcpk.
We have argued that following Algorithm 1 with a particular choice of prox–mapping,
the parameter estimates of each θ∗i converge to the true values and as a consequence we
can characterize the bound on how close the observed response and incentive value are to
their desired values. Knowing the true parameter values (even if obtained asymptotically)
for θ∗ allows the planner to make qualitative insights into the rationale behind the observed
responses.
6. Convergence in the Presence of Noise
In this section, we will use the unified framework that describes both the case where the
agents play according to Nash and where the agents play myopically. However, we consider
noisy updates given by
yk+1i = 〈ξki , θ∗i 〉+ wk+1i (22)
for each i ∈ I where wk+1i is an indepdent, identically distributed (i.i.d) real stochastic
process defined on a probability space (Ω,F ,P) adapted to the sequence of increasing sub-
σ–algebras (Fk, k ∈ N), where Fk is the σ–algebra generated by the set {yti , αti, wti , t ≤ k}
and such that the following hold2:
E[wk+1i |Fk] = 0 ∀k (23a)
E[(wk+1i )
2|Fk] = σ2 > 0 a.s. ∀k (23b)
supkE[(wk+1i )
4|Fk] < +∞ a.s. (23c)
Note that Fk is also the σ–algebra generated by {yti , ξti , t ≤ k} since wki can be deduced
from yki and ξ
k−1
i through the relationship w
k
i = y
k
i − 〈ξk−1i , θ∗i 〉 [9].
Theorem 3. Suppose that for each i ∈ I, {wki } satisfies (23a) and (23b) and that Algo-
rithm 1, with prox–mapping Pθ associated with β (modulus ν), is persistently exciting and
stable. Let the step–size ηk be selected such that
∑∞
k=1 η
2
k < ∞ and ηk −
η2k
2ν c˜s > 0 where
0 < c˜s < ∞ is such that ‖ξki ‖2∗ ≤ c˜s. Then, for each i ∈ I, Vk(θ∗i ) converges a.s. Further-
more, if the sequence {rk} where rk = (ηk)−1 is a non-decreasing, non-negative sequence
2. We use the abbreviation a.s. for almost surely.
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such that rk is Fk measurable and there exists constants 0 < K1,K2 < ∞ and 0 < T < ∞
such that
1
krk−1 ≤ K1 + K2k
∑k−1
t=0 ‖yt+1i − 〈ξti , θti〉 − wt+1i ‖2, ∀ k ≥ T, (24)
then
limk→∞ 1k
∑k−1
t=0 E[‖wt+1i − 〈ξti , θti − θ∗i 〉‖2|Ft] = σ2 a.s. (25)
In addition, if (23c) holds, then
limk→∞ 1k
∑k−1
t=0 ‖wt+1i − 〈ξti , θti − θ∗i 〉‖2 = σ2 a.s. (26)
The proof follows a similar technique to that presented in [9, Chapter 13.4]; hence,
we leave it to Appendix A. We remark that if β(θi) =
1
2‖θi‖22, then Theorem 3 implies
Vk(θ
∗
i ) =
1
2‖θ∗i − θki ‖22 converges a.s.
Corollary 4. Suppose agents play according to the myopic update rule (11) and that the
assumptions of Theorem 3 hold. Then,
limk→∞ 1k
∑k−1
t=0 E[‖xt+1i + wt+1i − xdi ‖2|Ft] = σ2 a.s.
Proof. Agent i’s response is xk+1i = 〈ξki , θ∗i 〉 + 〈Ψ(xk), αk〉 and the planner designs αki to
satisfy xdi = 〈ξki , θki 〉 + 〈Ψ(xk), αk〉. Hence, replacing 〈ξti , θti − θ∗i 〉 in (25) completes the
proof.
The results of Theorem 3 imply that the average mean square error between the ob-
servations and the predictions converges to σ2 a.s. and, if we recall, the observations are
derived from noisy versions of the first–order conditions for Nash. Indeed, we have shown
that
limk→∞ 1k
∑k−1
t=0E[‖〈DiΦ(xt+1), θ∗i 〉+ 〈DiΨ(xt+1), αti〉+ wt+1i ‖2|Ft] = σ2 a.s.
or, equivalently,
limk→∞ 1k
∑k−1
t=0E[‖〈DiΦ(xt+1), θ∗i − θti〉+ wt+1i ‖2|Ft] = σ2 a.s.
On the other hand, in the Nash–play case, it is difficult to say much about the observed
Nash equilibrium except in expectation. In particular, we can consider a modified version
of Theorem 2 where we consider the differential game form in expectation—i.e. at iteration
k, the differential game form for the induced game is
ω˜Gγ (θ, x) =
∑n
i=1 E
[〈DiΦ(x), θi〉+ 〈DiΨ(x), αki 〉+ wk+1i |Fk−1].
Proposition 1. Suppose that D2ω˜Gγ (θ, xd) is an isomorphism. Then there exists an  > 0,
such that for all θk ∈ B(θ∗),
‖x∗ − xd‖ ≤ (sup0≤λ≤1 ‖Dg((1− λ)θ∗ + λθk)‖)‖θk − θ‖
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(a) nominal (b) incentivized, λ = 0.0 (c) incentivized, λ = 0.1
Figure 1: Visualization of Nash equilibria for the (a) nominal, (b) incentivized (without regularization),
and (c) incentivized (with regularization λ = 0.1) games. Curves indicate the set of points where Difi ≡ 0
for each i ∈ {1, 2}; we have ω = (D1f1, D2f2) = 0 wherever the curves intersect. The stable, differential
Nash equilibria are indicated by a dark circle of which there are two for the nominal game. Given an initial
condition, Nash is calculated via a steepest descent algorithm [15]. The empirical basin of attraction for
each Nash equilibrium is illustrated by the filled region containing the point. In the incentivized game, the
coordinator aims to drive the agents to (xd1, x
d
2) = (−1.8, 0.5). For λ = 0.0, the unique Nash equilibrium
of the incentivized game with parameters (α1, α2) = (0.16,−0.94, 0.29,−0.11) is (xd1, xd2); however, for the
regularized incentivized game using with parameters (α1, α2) = (0.13, 0, 0.15, 0), there are two stable Nash
equilibria at (1.4,−0.9) and (−1.8, 0.5).
where Dg(θ∗) = −(D2ω˜Gγ )−1(θ∗, xd) ◦D1ω˜Gγ (θ∗, xd). and x∗ is a (local) Nash equilibrium
of the incentivized game Gγ = (fγ11 (x; θ∗1), . . . , fγnn (x, θ∗n)) with γi(x) = 〈Ψ(x), αki 〉 for each
i ∈ I. Furthermore, if ‖Dg(θ∗)‖ is uniformly bounded by M > 0 on B(θ∗), then
‖x∗ − xd‖ ≤M‖θk − θ∗‖.
To apply Proposition 1, we need a result ensuring that the parameter estimate θk con-
verges to the true parameter value θ∗. One of the consequences of Theorem 3 is that Vk(θ∗i )
converges a.s. and when β(θi) =
1
2‖θi‖22, ‖θ∗i − θki ‖22 converges a.s. If it is the case that
it converges a.s. to a value less than ε, then Proposition 1 would guarantee that a local
Nash equilibrium of the incentivized game is near the desired nondegenerate differential
Nash equilibrium in expectation. We leave further exploration of the convergence of the
parameter estimate θki as future work.
7. Numerical Examples
In this section we present several examples to illustrate the theoretical results of the previous
sections3.
7.1 Two-Player Coupled Oscillator Game
The first example we consider is a game between two players trying to control oscillators
that are coupled. Coupled oscillator models are used widely for applications including
3. Code for examples can be found at github.com/fiezt/Online-Utility-Learning-Incentive-Design.
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Figure 2: Estimation error for (a) λ = 0.0 and (d) λ = 0.1. Loss for (b) λ = 0.0 and (e) λ = 0.1. Persistence
of excitation (as measured by ‖ξ‖2) for the coupled oscillator with regularization (c) λ = 0.0 and (f) λ = 0.1
on the incentive parameters.
power [25], traffic [26], and biological [27] networks, and in coordinated motion control [28]
among many others. Furthermore, it is often the case that coupled oscillators are viewed in
a game–theoretic context in order to gain further insight into the system properties [29,30].
While the example is simple, it demonstrates that even in complex games on non–convex
strategy spaces (in particular, smooth manifolds), Algorithm 1 still achieves the desired
result.
Consider a game of coupled oscillators in which we have two players each one aiming to
minimize their nominal cost
fi(xi, x−i) = −θ∗i cos(xi) + cos(xi − x−i). (27)
Essentially, the game takes the form of a location game in which each player wants to be
near the origin while also being as far away as possible from the other player’s phase. The
coordinator selects αi ∈ R2, i ∈ {1, 2} such that (xd1, xd2) is the Nash equilibrium of the
game with incentivized costs
fγi (xi, x−i) = fi(xi, x−i) + αi,1 sin(xi − xdi ) + αi,2 cos(xi − xdi ). (28)
Using Algorithm 1, we estimate θ1 and θ2 while designing incentives that induce the players
to play (xd1, x
d
2). In this example, we set θ1 = 1.0 and θ2 = 1.05 and set the desired Nash at
(xd1, x
d
2) = (1.8,−0.5).
In Fig. 1a, we show a visualization of the Nash equilibria for the game where the
square represents the unfolded torus with player 1’s choice along the x-axis and player
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2’s choice along the y-axis. The solid and dashed black lines depict the zero sets for
the derivatives of player 1 and 2 respectively. The intersections of these lines are all the
candidate Nash equilibrium (all the Nash equilibria of the game must be in the set of
intersection points of these lines). There are four intersection points: {x|ω(x) = 0} =
{(0, pi), (pi, pi), (1.1,−1.0), (−1.1, 1.0)}. Of the four, the first two are not Nash equilibria
which can be verified by checking the necessary conditions for Nash. However, (0, pi) is a
saddle point and (pi, pi) is an unstable equilibrium for the dynamics x˙ = −ω(x). The last
two points are stable differential Nash equilibria. We indicate each of them with a circle in
Fig. 1a and the colored regions show the empirical basin of attraction for each of the points.
In Fig. 1b and 1c, we show similar visualizations of the Nash equilibria but for the in-
centivized game. In the incentive design step of the algorithm, we can add a regularization
term to the constrained least squares for selecting the incentive parameters. The regulariza-
tion changes the problem and may be added if it is desirable for the incentives to be small
or sparse for instance. Fig. 1b and 1c are for the case without and with regularization,
respectively, where we regularize with λ‖α‖22.
As we adjust the regularization parameter λ, it has the effect of reducing the norm of
the incentive parameters and as a consequence, what happens is that the number of stable
Nash equilibria changes. In particular, a larger value of λ results in small incentive values
and, in turn, non-uniqueness in the number of stable Nash equilibria in the incentivized
game. There is a tradeoff between uniqueness of the desired Nash equilibrium and how
much the coordinator is willing to expend to incentivize the agents.
Moreover, in Fig. 2, we see that in the unregularized case (λ = 0) the estimation error
for θ2 appears not to converge to zero while in the regularized case (λ = 0.1) it does. This
is likely due to the fact that Algorithm 1 is not persistently exciting for the unregularized
problem (see Fig. 2c where ‖ξ1‖2 drops to zero) while it is in the regularized case (see Fig. 2f
where ‖ξi‖2, i = 1, 2 are always non-zero).
We remark that this example highlights that the technical conditions of the theoretical
results in the preceding sections—in particular, persistence of excitation—matter in prac-
tice. Indeed, regularization allows for the problem to be persistently exciting. There are
other methods for inducing persistence of excitation such as adding noise or ensuring the
input is sufficiently rich [31].
7.2 Bertrand Nash Competition
In this section, we explore classical Bertrand competition. Following [32], we adopt a
stylized model inspired by [33]. We consider a two firm competition. Firms are assumed
to have full information and they choose their prices (x1, x2) to maximize their revenue
Ri(xi, x−i, τ) = xiFi(xi, x−i, τ) where Fi is the demand and τ is a normally distributed
i.i.d. random variable that is common knowledge and represents economic indicators such
as gross domestic product.
When firms compete with their nominal revenue functions Ri, the random variable τ
changes over time causing demand shocks which, in turn, cause prices to shift. In our
framework, we introduce a regulator that wants to push the prices chosen by firms towards
some desired pricing level by introducing incentives. It is assumed that the regulator also
has knowledge of τ .
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Figure 3: (a) Agent response and (b) parameter estimation error. While the agents’ responses converge
relatively quickly to the desired responses (within a range dictated by the statistics of the noise term τ),
the parameter estimation takes quite a bit longer to converge within 1e-2. This is in part due to the fact
that the response converges quickly and the information that can be attained from the responses is limited;
hence, it takes a while to improve the estimate.
We explore several variants of this problem to highlight the theoretical results as well
as desirable empirical results we observe under relaxed assumptions on the knowledge the
planner has of agent behavior.
As noted in the previous example, the assumption of persistence of excitation, which
also appears in the adaptive control literature, is hard to verify a priori ; however, selecting
basis functions from certain classes such as radial basis functions which are known to be
persistently exciting [34, 35] can help to overcome this issue. We note that this is not a
perfect solution; it may make the algorithm persistently exciting, yet result in a solution
which is not asymptotically incentive compatible, i.e. xki 9 xdi . Since we seek classes
of problems that are persistently exciting and asymptotically incentive compatible, this
exposes an interesting avenue for future research.
7.2.1 True Model Known to Planner
We consider each firm i to have a linear marginal revenue function given by
Mi(x
k, τk) = θ∗i,1x
k
1 + θ
∗
i,2x
k
2 + θ
∗
i,ix
k
i + τ
k, (29)
and the firm price to evolve according to a gradient play update
xk+1i = x
k
i + ζ
k
i (Mi(x
k
i , x
k
−i, τ
k) + 〈Ψi(xki , xk−i), αki 〉) (30)
where ζki > 0 is the learning rate which we choose to ensure stability of the process. We let
the incentive basis functions be the following set of Gaussian radial basis functions:
Ψi,1(x
k
i , x
k
−i) = exp(−κ(xki − xdi )2)
Ψi,2(x
k
i , x
k
−i) = exp(−κ(xki + xdi )2)
Ψi,3(x
k
i , x
k
−i) = exp(−κ(xki )2)
(31)
with κ = 0.01. In order to test the theoretical results, in this example we assume the
regulator has knowledge of the true nominal basis functions and assumes a gradient play
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Figure 4: Prices for best response (gradient and fictitious play are similar).
model for the firms, Φ(xk1, x
k
2) = {xk1, xk2}, and updates its estimate of the firm prices
according to
xk+1i = x
k
i + ζ
k
i (〈Φi(xki , xk−i), θˆki 〉+ τk + 〈Ψi(xki , xk−i), αki 〉).
For this simulation we use τ ∼ N (5, 0.25), θ∗1 = (−1.2,−0.5), and θ∗2 = (0.3,−1), and for
all Bertrand examples we set the desired prices at (xd1, x
d
2) = (5, 7).
In Fig. 3a, we show the firm prices and the regulator’s estimates of the firm prices over
the first 100 iterations of the simulation. The firm prices xi almost immediately converge
to the desired prices xdi . Likewise, the regulator’s estimates of the firm prices xˆi rapidly
converge to the true firm prices. We remark that in our simulations we observe that even
with fewer incentive basis functions, the firm prices can still be pushed to the desired prices.
Correspondingly, we find that increasing the number of incentive basis functions can increase
the speed of convergence to the desired prices as well as mitigate the impact of noise due
to more flexibility in the choice of incentives.
In Fig. 3b, we show that the regulator’s estimates of the parameters of the marginal
revenue function for each firm converge to the true parameters. While in this example the
speed of estimation convergence is considerably slower than the convergence of the firm
prices to the desired prices, we observe multiple factors that can significantly increase the
speed of estimation convergence. Namely, as the variance of the economic indicator term
τ increases, consequently providing more information at each iteration, the convergence
speed also increases. Moreover, the stability of the process, dictated by the parameters of
the marginal revenue functions, is positively correlated with the speed of convergence. We
also note that the problem is persistently exciting and the expected loss decreases rapidly
to zero.
7.2.2 Planner Agnostic to Myopic Update Rule
We now transition to examples which demonstrate that our framework is suitable for prob-
lem instances that go beyond our theoretical results. In particular, we find even if the
planner does not have access to the true nominal basis functions that govern the dynamics
of agent play, agent responses can still be driven to a desired response for several forms of
myopic updates. In these examples, we again consider firms to have the linear marginal
revenue function from (29). We then allow the firm price to evolve according to either the
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Figure 5: (a) Response estimation error for different update methods and (b) difference between desired and
true response for different update methods. Note that in (a) and (b) the best response and fictitious play
methods are nearly identical; this is due to the fact that fictitious play is best response to the historical
average. We remark that it takes longer for fictitious play to converge given the incentive and noise at each
iteration.
gradient play update from (30), a best response update given by
xk+1i = arg maxxi
Ri(xi, x
k
−i, τ
k) + γki (xi, x
k
−i),
or a fictitious play update given by
xk+1i = arg maxxi
Ri(xi, x¯
(l,k)
−i , τ
k) + γki (xi, x¯
(l,k)
−i )
where x¯
(l,k)
−i is the average over the history from l to k with 0 ≤ l ≤ k. For all simulations
we choose to use the complete history, i.e. l = 0.
We choose the set of incentive basis functions to be same as in (31), but now consider the
nominal basis functions to not include the true basis functions and instead be the following
set of Gaussian radial basis functions:
Φi,1(x
k
i , x
k
−i) = exp(−κ(xki )2)
Φi,2(x
k
i , x
k
−i) = exp(−κ(xki − xk−i)2)
Φi,3(x
k
i , x
k
−i) = exp(−κ(xk−i)2)
(32)
with κ = 0.01 as before. In this example, the regulator uses an update to its estimate of
the prices, given by
xk+1i = 〈Φi(xki , xk−i), θˆki 〉+ τk + 〈Ψi(xki , xk−i), αki 〉, (33)
which is agnostic to the firm update method. We use τ ∼ N (5, 0.1) and, as before, let the
parameters of the marginal revenue functions be θ∗1 = (−1.2,−0.5), and θ∗2 = (0.3,−1).
In Fig. 5, we show the firm prices and the regulator’s estimates of the firm prices when
the firms use best response (each of the other methods have similar plots). As was the case
when the regulator had knowledge of the true nominal basis functions, the regulator is able
to quickly estimate the true firm prices accurately and push the firm prices to the desired
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Figure 6: Estimated cost components for each firm when the firms use the best response update method:
(a) linear marginal revenue and (b) non-linear marginal revenue. (c) Agent responses for gradient play with
a non-linear marginal revenue functions.
prices. Figs. 5a and 5b show that the regulator’s estimate of the firm prices converges to the
true firm prices—i.e. ‖xˆk − x‖2 → 0—and the true firm responses converge to the desired
responses—i.e. ‖xk − xd‖2 → 0—at nearly the same rates.
In Fig. 6a, we show the nominal and incentive cost components that form the regulator’s
estimate of the firm prices when the firms are use best response. Analogous to the firm
prices, we note that these components are similar for each of the firms’ update methods.
We highlight this to point out that the nominal cost and incentive cost components do
not simply cancel one another out, indicating that a portion of the true dynamics are
maintained.
7.2.3 Nonlinear Marginal Revenue
To conclude our examples, we explore a Bertrand competition in which each firm has a
nonlinear marginal revenue function given by
Mi(x
k, τk) = log(xki ) + θ
∗
i,1x
k
1 + θ
∗
i,2x
k
2 + θ
∗
i,ix
k
i + θi,3 + τ
k + 1.
Here, we let the firm price evolve according to the gradient play update from (30) with
the nonlinear marginal revenue function and let the regulator use the agnostic method to
update its estimate of the firms’ prices from (33) with the nominal basis functions from
(32) and the incentive basis functions from (31). We use the same noise parameters as in
the preceding examples and and let the parameters of the marginal revenue functions be
θ∗1 = (−1.2,−0.5, 7.5), and θ∗2 = (0.3,−1, 1.5).
In Fig. 6b, we show the estimated revenue and incentive components for the two firms.
In Fig. 6c, we observe that the response of the firms to the regulator is marginally different
from what we observed in previous examples when the firms had linear marginal revenue
functions, but nonetheless the regulator’s estimates of the firm prices converge to the true
firm prices and the true firm prices converge to the desired prices.
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8. Conclusion
We present a new method for adaptive incentive design when a planner faces competing
agents of unknown type. Specifically, we provide an algorithm for learning the agents’
decision-making process and updating incentives. We provide convergence guarantees on
the algorithm. We show that under reasonable assumptions, the agents’ true response is
driven to the desired response and, under slightly more restrictive assumptions, the true
preferences can be learned asymptotically. We provide several numerical examples that
both verify the theory as well as demonstrate the performance when we relax the theoretical
assumptions.
Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 1
The following proof uses Young’s inequality:
vT1 v2 ≤ ‖v1‖∗‖v2‖ ≤ 12
(‖v1‖2∗
ν + ν‖v2‖2
)
(34)
for any v1, v2 ∈ Rm.
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof is the essentially the same as the proof for [12, Lemma 2.1]
with a few modifications.
Let θk ∈ (Θk)◦ and θk+1 = P k+1
θk
(g). Note that
θk+1 ∈ argminθ′∈Θk+1
{
〈g, θ′ − θk〉+ V (θk, θ′)
}
(35)
or equivalently,
θk+1 ∈ argminθ′∈Θk+1
{
β(θ′)− 〈∇β(θk)− g, θ′〉
}
(36)
where the latter form tells us that β is differentiable at θk+1 and θk+1 ∈ (Θk+1)◦. Since
∇2V (θk, θk+1) = ∇β(θk+1)−∇β(θk), the optimality conditions for (36) imply that
〈∇β(θk+1)−∇β(θk) + g, θk+1 − θ〉 ≤ 0, ∀θ ∈ Θk+1 (37)
Note that this is where the proof of [12, Lemma 2.1] and the current proof are different. The
above inequality holds here for all θ ∈ Θk+1 whereas in the proof of [12, Lemma 2.1]—using
the notation of the current Lemma—the inequality would have held for all θ ∈ Θk. In
particular, we need the inequality to hold for θ∗ and it does since by assumption θ∗ ∈ Θk+1
for each k.
First, 〈∇β(θk), θk+1 − θk〉 ≤ β(θk+1)− β(θk). Hence, for θ∗ ∈ Θk+1, we have that
V (θk+1, θ∗)− V (θk, θ∗)
= β(θ∗)− 〈∇β(θk+1), θ∗ − θk+1)〉 − β(θk+1)
− (β(θ∗)− 〈∇β(θk), θ∗ − θk〉 − β(θk))
= 〈∇β(θk+1)−∇β(θk) + g, θk+1 − θ∗〉+ 〈g, θ∗ − θk+1)〉
≤ 〈g, θ∗ − θk+1〉 − V (θk, θk+1)
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where the last inequality holds due to (37). By (34), we have that
〈g, θk − θk+1〉 ≤ 12ν ‖g‖2∗ + ν2‖θk − θk+1‖2. (38)
Further, ν2‖θk − θk+1‖2 ≤ V (θk, θk+1) since V (θk, ·) is strongly convex. Thus,
V (θk+1, θ∗)− V (θk, θ∗)
≤ 〈g, θ∗ − θk+1〉 − V (θk, θk+1)
= 〈g, θ∗ − θk〉+ 〈g, θk − θk+1〉 − V (θk, θk+1)
≤ 〈g, θ∗ − θk〉+ 12ν ‖g‖2∗
so that
V (P k+1
θ(k)
(g), θ∗) ≤ V (θ(k), θ∗) + 〈g, θ∗ − θ(k)〉+ 12ν ‖g‖2∗.
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 3
Proposition 2 ( [36]). Let {xt} be a zero conditional mean sequence of random variables
adapted to {Ft}. If
∑∞
t=0
1
t2
E[x2t |Ft−1] <∞ a.s, then limN→∞ 1N
∑N
t=1 xt = 0 a.s.
Proof of Theorem 3. Starting from Lemma 1, we have
E[Vt+1(θ∗i )|Ft] ≤ Vt(θ∗i )− ηt〈ξti ,∆θti〉(E[yt+1i − 〈ξti , θti〉|Ft])
+
η2t
2ν
‖ξti‖2∗
(
(‖E[yt+1i − (ξti)T θti |Ft]‖)2 + σ2
)
≤ Vt(θ∗i )−
(
ηt − η
2
t ‖ξti‖2∗
2ν
) (‖E[yt+1i − (ξti)T θti |Ft]‖)2 + η2t2ν ‖ξti‖2∗σ2
≤ Vt(θ∗i )−
(
ηt − η
2
t
2ν c˜1
)(‖E[yt+1i − (ξti)T θti |Ft]‖)2 + η2t2ν c˜1σ2.
By the assumptions that ηt − η
2
t
2ν c˜1 > 0 and
∑∞
t=1 η
2
t <∞, we can use the fact that yt+1i =
〈ξti , θ∗i 〉+ wt+1i and apply the almost supermartingale convergence theorem [37] to get that∑∞
t=1
(
ηt − η
2
t
2ν c˜1
) (‖E[wt+1i − 〈ξti , θti − θ∗i 〉|Ft]‖)2 <∞
a.s. and that Vt(θ
∗
i ) converges a.s.
Now, we argue (25) holds; the argument follows that which is presented in [8, Chapter
8]. To do this, we first show that
limT→∞ 1T
∑T−1
t=0 ‖〈ξti , θti − θ∗i 〉‖2 = 0 a.s. (39)
Note that (B) implies that
limT→∞
∑T−1
t=0
1
rt
‖〈ξti , θti − θ∗i 〉‖2 <∞ a.s. (40)
Where rt = (ηt − η
2
t
2ν c˜1)
−1. Suppose that rt is bounded—i.e. there exists K3 such that
rt < K3 <∞. In this case, it is immediate from (40) that
limT→∞ 1K3
∑T−1
t=0 ‖〈ξti , θti − θ∗i 〉‖2 <∞ a.s. (41)
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so that (39) follows trivially. On the other hand, suppose rt is unbounded. Then we can
apply Kronecker’s Lemma [9] to conclude that
limT→∞ 1rT
∑T−1
t=0 ‖〈ξti , θti − θ∗i 〉‖2 = 0 a.s. (42)
Hence, from (24), we have
limT→∞
1
T
∑T−1
t=0 ‖〈ξti ,θti−θ∗i 〉‖2
K1+
K2
T
∑T−1
t=0 ‖〈ξti ,θti−θ∗i 〉‖2
= 0 a.s. (43)
so that (39) follows immediately. Note that
E[(yt+1i − (ξti)T θti)2|Ft] = E[(yt+1i − 〈ξti , θti〉 − wt+1i + wt+1i )2|Ft]
= E[(yt+1i − 〈ξti , θ(t)i 〉 − wt+1i )2 + (wt+1i )2
+ 2〈yt+1i − 〈ξti , θ(t)i 〉 − wt+1i , wt+1i 〉|Ft]
Since yt+1i − wt+1i and 〈ξti , θti〉 are Ft–measurable and E[wt+1i |Ft] = 0 a.s., we have
E[(yt+1i − 〈ξti , θti〉)2|Ft] = (yt+1i − 〈ξti , θti〉 − wt+1i )2 − E[(wt+1i )2|Ft].
Replacing yt+1i = 〈ξti , θ∗i 〉+wt+1i and using (39), we see that (25) holds since E[(wt+1i )2|Ft] =
σ2 a.s.
Finally, if supt E[(wt+1i )4|Ft] < +∞ almost surely, then by Proposition 2, we have
limT→∞ 1T
∑T−1
t=0 ‖wt+1i − 〈ξti , θti − θ∗i 〉‖2 = σ2 a.s.
which concludes the proof.
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